Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Exploring the "Second Image"

(1) The Organizational Process Model

- The state is a collection of loosely allied organizations (a plurality of actors)
- These organizations, which the govt. consists of, are divided each with a primary responsibility
- The state acts in accordance with the routines that these organizations enact
  - Each organization attends to a special set of problems and acts on these problems
  - The organizations will act in somewhat independence of other organizations
  - Therefore, the decision making of the state comes from the independent behavior of a multiple number of organizations
    - Each organization has a set of standard operating procedures with regard to problem solving and policy making

- What does this mean for foreign policy? It means that the innate procedural functions of govt. organizations are the main factors that drive policy making among executive branch officials
- This means that the hierarchy of govt. - the chief executive and cabinet level officials - have very little control over the factors involved in making foreign policy
- The high level policy makers are limited to the structured routines that make-up the lower level organizations
- Thus, policy and state behavior is already determined prior to an event occurring

Examples of the Organizational Process Model

(A) Military Mobilization of Any State

- A state's decision to enter a war is really an organizational one
  - At the bottom, there are soldiers in platoons>These platoons are in companies>these companies are in armies>these armies are acting in response to orders given by lieutenants and captains>
these orders coincide with the fixed routines and standard procedures of the military

(B) World War I

- When Austria-Hungary marched into Serbia, Russian forces began to mobilize to defend Serbia
- Czar Nicholas at first ordered partial mobilization of the military - just to show Austria that Russia was willing to defend the Serbs
- However, Russian military leadership informed the Czar that partial mobilization would make full mobilization almost impossible; thus, the military urged the Czar to order full mobilization (Russian mobilization capabilities were slower than any other major power involved)
- Germany, viewing the Russian full mobilization, responded with its full mobilization
- This gave Russia the impression that Germany was initiating aggression; thus, Russia committed to defending Serbia
- Austria-Hungary, seeing both the German and Russian mobilization, and fearing that Germany might back out on its alliance pact with Austria, ignored diplomatic communications from Berlin and marched into Serbia
- Therefore, it was not German power ambition or interests that created WWI (as argued earlier in the semester); rather, it was the fixed routines of the countries' military doctrines and capabilities that created the "domino" effect toward war. Germany, actually did not want war. All states were drawn into war by way of military organizational routines

(C) U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy and Vietnam

- Vietnam was lost due to organizational and doctrinal inflexibility
- Counterinsurgency had no place in the military assistance program; was dominated by conventional military strategy for years
- When counterinsurgency doctrine was written into the program, many in the officer corps refused to adapt it
- According to one General during the conflict, "I'll be damned if I permit the United States Army, its institutions, doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war!"
- American military doctrine was mirrored in the military doctrine of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)
- The U.S. Army gave ARVN the doctrine of "find, fix, fight and finish"
- The ARVN was taught that the solution in Vietnam is more bombs, more shells, more napalm, "until the other side cracks and gives up."
- Like U.S. military organizational doctrine, ARVN learned to rely on armor, artillery, and transport - all three limited ARVN's ability to fight guerilla warfare

(2) Bureaucratic Politics Model

- Also sees the state as a plurality of actors
- Policy outcomes are not based on the single, national interests of the state
- Policy results from either compromise, competition or coalitions among govt. officials
- These govt. officials have different perspectives of the same issue
- Policy advisors and officials within the executive branch will bargain, log-roll, and politic among each other
- Many times, the President will choose the policy option that is favored by the coalition that includes a member that is influential with the President
- The proposals put forth by various groups, or coalitions, within the executive branch are based on the interests of the respective bureaucracies that individual or group represents
- "Where one sits is where one stands" on a particular conflict or issue
- Any policy that advances the interests or goals of a particular cabinet-level dept., bureaucratic office or agency is promoted by that bureaucracy
- For example, if a given conflict might require a military campaign, then perhaps key officials within the Pentagon or Joint Chiefs of Staff would support military deployment and the use of force; meanwhile officials within the State Dept. would favor and call for a diplomatic settlement - or visa-versa
- This would cause an internal battle between the various actors within the govt.
- The President usually decides what policy to go with on the strength of the coalition building and, thus, favorable balance of power from each actor - in other words, which coalition of bureaucratic actors will make a more persuasive argument with the Pres.¿; Or which group of actors are more influential with the Pres.¿
- Conflicts can involve a multiple # of actors; political battles can consist of cabinet-level secretaries, under-secretaries, White House senior policy advisors or entire bureaucratic offices

Examples of the Bureaucratic Politics Model
(A) Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis

- Started with the discovery of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba in October, 1962
- Led to the formation of the Executive Commission (ExComm), which presented JFK with a # of options
- (1) Defense Secretary Robert McNamara advocated a "do nothing" approach
  - From McNamara's point of view, "a missile is just a missile... it makes no difference whether you are killed by a missile from the Soviet Union or Cuba."
- McNamara looked at the situation from the viewpoint of a military tactician who saw no tactical or logistical difference in a ballistic missile's point of origin
- (2) National Security Council (NSC) assistant McGeorge Bundy favored a more diplomatic settlement to the crisis
  - Bundy proposed making a request to the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) for an inspection team to come to Cuba and verify the presence of offensive missiles
  - Bundy also proposed a meeting with Soviet leader Khrushchev to negotiate the removal of the missiles from Cuba, making Cuba neutral, U.S. withdrawal from Guantanamo Bay and U.S. removal of Jupiter Missiles from Turkey
    - In other words, Bundy proposed a diplomatic compromise between the US and USSR
    - Because Bundy was one of the main supporters and organizers of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961,
      Bundy perhaps saw the problems and risks of military force and, thus, called for diplomacy
  - (3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) called for a military solution to the conflict
    - The JCS had long prepared contingency plans for an offensive strike against Cuba - this was seen as the moment of truth by the JCS
    - Thus, the JCS called for an air-strike to finally "cleanse" the Western Hemisphere of Communism
    - Argued that the Soviets had inserted the missiles in a daring challenge to the U.S., which must be met
    - Secretary of State Dean Rusk also supported the air strike, as a need to respond to the USSR with force
    - By now, the "do-nothing" and diplomatic proposals had been thrown out; JFK decided that something affirmative had to be done to counter Soviet actions
  - (4) With that, McNamara and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Roswell Gilpatric) called for a naval blockade
- A naval blockade was seen as the best combination of doing something to respond to the USSR; yet, this response could be seen as a defensive response and, thus, not seen as aggressive or "hard-line"
- Just as importantly, it would be McNamara and Gilpatric's Pentagon that would have primary responsibility for carrying out the blockade
- It was McNamara that was seen as JFK's closest advisor (second to RFK) in foreign/defense affairs
- Also, RFK came out for the blockade
- Therefore, the "blockade coalition" of McNamara, RFK, and Theodore Sorenson (President's Special Counsel) held more influence and sway with JFK than the "air-strike" coalition of the JCS, Rusk and Dean Acheson (NCS Head)
- Because JFK did not have much personal compatibility with the latter coalition, the Pres. was more in favor of the recommendations of his preferred coalition - whom he trusted more
- As a result, JFK opted for the naval blockade

(B) Johnson and the Escalation of Vietnam (1965)

- 1965 marked the year that the U.S. increased its troop contingent in Vietnam
- By July, 1965 LBJ was given two options: (1) Cut losses and withdraw all forces from Vietnam
- This option 1 coalition consisted of Press Secretary Bill Moyers, State Dept. advisor James Thompson, and Under-Secretary of State George Ball
- This coalition saw a long and protracted war where the U.S. could not win against an "invisible enemy" in "jungle-rice paddies"
- Concerned of how world opinion would view the U.S. in a scenario that saw the world's largest military power unable to win a war against "a handful of guerrillas"; prestige and political influence mattered to the option 1 coalition
- (2) Major military escalation with significant increases in deployment levels, along with a tax increase
- Option 2 Coalition consisted of the JCS and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara
- A major troop escalation was the only way to bring about negotiations with North Vietnam
- McNamara had told LBJ that increased bombing and troop levels would bring about a favorable outcome
- The Option 2 coalition focused on the military-oriented "peace-through-strength" solution
- Military deterrence and establishing credibility were what mattered to the coalition
LBJ shared the same perception; was a supporter of the "Domino Theory" and also of keeping the word
of three former Presidents (Truman, Ike, JFK) who had made
commitments on behalf of the French colonial
govt. to support South Vietnam
- So, did LBJ already have this decision made - regardless of what
which coalition said? ("First Image"?)
- Evidence that Bureaucratic Politics was a factor: NSC Advisor
McGeorge Bundy was critical of option 2;
saw this policy as a "slippery slope" toward total U.S. responsibility
without a clear strategy for Vietnam
- Yet, he rejected option 1 because of the influence that option 2 had
with LBJ; instead, Bundy called for
a middle ground (option 3): called for a smaller, more modest
increase - at least this would reject
withdrawal and making concessions, without the dangerous
slippery-slope commitment of the larger deployment level
- Sure enough, LBJ announced an increase of 75,000 to 125,000
troops (not the 200,000 as proposed by option 2 coalition) - without a
tax increase or any additional reserves
- Also, State Dept. consisted of entrenched, hawkish bureaucrats;
State Dept's Bureau of Far East Asian
Affairs consisted of men who were rigid, inflexible and
"dispassionate"; these bureaucrats were committed
to the containment and isolation of Communism and to the
influencing of neutral states toward the U.S.
- Within State Dept., U.S. Foreign Service wanted to prove that it could
bring about political stability and nation-building
in Vietnam; CIA had interests in proving that it could handle covert
operations; Agency for International
Development want to show that the "pacification" of Vietnam could
bring about economic investment into
the country
- The Pentagon had its branches interested in Vietnam action: Air
Force (air power capability), Navy (supercarrier
based capability)

(3) Bush, The "Neo-Cons" and Iraq